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1. Introduction
In the last two decades, a large empirical literature has investigated the implications of
“legal origins” on a wide range of economic variables, such as investor protection, contract
enforcement and labour market regulation.1 As pointed out by La Porta et al. (2004), “...
despite the evidence, the exact mechanism through which legal origin matters has remained
uncertain.” To investigate this issue, this paper models in a stylized way judicial decision
making under common and civil law. We compute the welfare consequences of the two
legal regimes and investigate the conditions under which one regime is preferable to the
other. Besides efficiency, we also identify an additional desideratum of the legal system: the
“uniformity” or “consistency” of the law as embodied by court decisions.2 We ask whether
legal consistency is achieved under the two legal systems and whether there is a trade-off
between legal consistency on the one hand and equitable decisions and flexibility on the
other.
Following traditional comparative law doctrine, we assume that common law is established
by judicial precedents and decisions.3 Stare decisis is what requires courts under common law
to conform to decisions reached by previous courts.4 Conversely, under civil law the center of
authority is the legislature, and the role of civil law judges is to interpret and apply a body of
statutes and administrataive regulations.5 We recognize that in practice it is hard to identify
“pure” forms of either system (Zweigert and Kötz, 1998). Under common law the body of
statutes has expanded dramatically through time (Calabresi, 1982) and precedents play some
1In a nutshell “legal origins” is a short-hand for whether a country’s legal system can be traced back to
British common law or French civil law. See La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 1999), Acemoglu and Johnson
(2004), Beck et al. (2003b), Spamann (2010), Djankov et al. (2002), Rajan and Zingales (2003), Botero et al.
(2004), Lamoreaux and Rosenthal (2005), La Porta et al. (2008), and Nunn (2009) among many others.
2Terminology is somewhat tricky here. It is common to refer to “legal certainty” in the legal tradition.
In our set up, there is no randomness in the decisions of any court, and so this seems an inappropriate term
in our context. Here, we focus on a closely related concept. By “consistency” or “uniformity” we mean the
degree to which similar cases (identical ones in fact) will yield a similar (or indeed the same) court decision.
To avoid confusion, from now on we will refer to this property of a legal system as “consistency” without
further comments.
3See Calabresi (1982, ch. 9) for a discussion of the democratic legitimacy of court-made law.
4Stare decisis is a Latin term which literally means “to stand by things decided.” The meaning of this rule
is well captured by Radin (1933): “If a court follows a previous decision, because a revered master has uttered
it, because it is the right decision, because it is logical, because it is just, [...] that is not an application of
stare decisis. To make the act such an application, the previous decision must be followed because it is a
previous decision and for no other reason.” See also Peters (1996).
5Civil law refuses any binding effect to previous judicial interpretation. According to Von Mehren (1957,
ch. 16) this principle holds in France, where even precedents by a hierarchically superior court are never
binding, and to a lesser degree in Germany. On the German law, see also Oppermann (2018).
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role also under civil law (Hondius, 2005). Nevertheless, we believe that our analysis can shed
new light on the relative merits of precedents and statutes.6
We assume that judges can be of two types. A fraction of judges are “conservative” and
mechanically follow the precedent (under common law) or the statute (under civil law). The
remaining judges are “active” and maximize social welfare. To some extent, this distinction
captures the two main legal theories in jurisprudence (Summers, 1982). On the one hand,
proponents of legal formalism argue that judicial discretion poses a threat to legal certainty
and to democratic legitimacy.7 On the other hand, the followers of instrumentalism believe
that judges retain a considerable amount of discretion to fill in the gaps in existing laws and
that the law should be used as a tool to balance competing societal interests.
A key feature of our analysis is that “active” judges suffer from time-consistency problems.
Consider an environment in which the ex-ante optimal law is suboptimal ex-post, when the
relevant economic choices are sunk. Such an ex-post bias generates a hold-up problem and
may have serious consequences on economic outcomes. A leading example is the enforcement
of property rights. Consider a possible investment that increases output. Active courts have
the incentive to announce strict property-right enforcement in order to encourage investment.
However, after investment has been sunk, judges are tempted to choose a weaker ruling.
Foreseeing this, investment will be sub-optimally low.8 As we show below, the common and
civil law regimes deal differently with the ex-post bias. This has novel implications in terms
of relative efficiency and consistency.
While the literature has devoted considerable attention to the study of judicial partisan
bias, stemming from courts that have preferences favoring one of the two sides in the legal
dispute,9 time-inconsistency problems in court decision-making remain relatively understud-
6There are, of course, other (unmodeled) differences between the two legal traditions. For instance, the
two systems differ in the ways of exposing evidence in court: adversarial (under common law) vs. inquisitorial
procedure (under civil law). Moreover, judges under common law are elected or appointed by the executive
(usually the legislative body must confirm the appointment), while under civil law there is a career judiciary
with training and promotion inside the ranks.
7“The main danger in judicial interpretation [...] is that judges will mistake their own predilections for
the law.” Scalia (1989).
8There are many other examples of environments in which there is a potential time-inconsistency in judicial
decisions. Consider a court that examines a patent infringement case. Ex-ante, the optimal breadth of the
patent takes into account the incentives to invest in R&D. Ex-post, however, it is optimal to open the market
to competition. In tort law, an ex-post bias might also arise when courts apply the “economic loss rule” (see
Niblett et al. 2010).
9See, for instance, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007b), Ponzetto and Fernandez (2008) and Guerriero (2016a,
2016b).
Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 3
ied. Anderlini et al. (2014) analyzes the implications of time-inconsistency problems that
afflict courts in the common law regime, and is in some sense a point of departure for this
paper.10
Aside from numerous modeling differences, the main contribution of this paper relative to
Anderlini et al. (2014) is twofold. First, we provide a model of the civil law regime. This allows
us to compare the two legal traditions. Given that time-consistency problems are pervasive
in courts, we believe that our comparative analysis constitutes a meaningful extension to the
legal-origin literature. Second, we introduce stochastic shocks which change the optimal law.
This modeling choice is novel and distinguishes our paper from most of the related literature
which assumes that the optimal law is constant (see for example Ponzetto and Fernandez,
2008, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007a,b). By considering a time-varying optimal policy, we are
able to identify the degree of adaptability of the two legal traditions. The “adaptability”
channel is often put forward to explain why legal institutions have real consequences (Beck et
al, 2003a, 2005). A widespread view (Hayek, 1973) is that judge-made law is more responsive
than statutes to changing economics circumstances. Our set up in this paper allows this
claim to be tested.
Civil law partly solves time-inconsistency problems by limiting court discretion. Decisions
by courts must lie in an interval centered around the written statute. This assumption
captures the idea that judicial discretion can be limited but it cannot be completely taken
away from civil law judges. We show that under civil law, the statute is set strategically to
offset the incentives of active courts to deviate ex-post. In anticipation of the application of
the law, statutes prescribe “stricter” rules than the ex-ante optimum. This improves civil
law welfare, but cannot generally lead to full efficiency. We show that the application of the
law is not uniform. Conservative judges are excessively strict because they interpret the law
literally, while the active ones are excessively lenient. Judicial heterogeneity leads to legal
inconsistency in the sense we have discussed above.11
Under common law, instead, lawmaking power has been delegated to judges, making time-
consistency problems potentially severe. We show that the rule of precedent has a disciplinary
role. The threat that in the future conservative judges will follow inefficient precedents helps
to sustain the ex-ante optimal law. The disciplinary role of stare decisis is more effective
10We return to the relationship between this paper and Anderlini et al. (2014) in greater details in Section
2 below.
11See Footnote 2 above.
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when the proportion of conservative judges is higher, because this implies that deviations
from the ex-ante optimal decision have more lasting consequences. We also show that the
rule of precedent helps to achieve legal consistency by linking current judicial decisions to
future ones. Thanks to stare decisis, all types of common law court enforce the same decisions,
making common law more consistent.
However, the welfare comparison of the two legal systems is ambiguous. We show below
that civil law dominates in terms of efficiency when judges are relatively homogenous (that
is, they are mostly conservative or mostly active) and/or when judicial latitude under civil
law is sufficiently narrow. On the other hand, we show that in the context of our model,
common law is unambiguously better in achieving legal consistency than civil law. Notice
that this result goes against the common view, especially among civil law advocates, that
statutes lead to greater consistency in the law than precedents.12 We emphasize that this
result is obtained in a model where judges have the same preferences, but differ with respect
to their legal reasoning (some judges are conservative, while others maximize welfare). This
drives the difference between our findings and those in the literature that studies partisan
judges.
In the second part of the paper, we introduce shocks to the environment that change the
optimal law and study how the two legal traditions adapt. Shocks introduce a fundamental
trade-off between commitment and flexibility: on the one hand, rules (either statutes or
precedents) provide valuable commitment, thus limiting inefficient decisions. But on the
other hand, there is a cost of reduced flexibility as rules cannot be made contingent on every
single shock or contingency, and some discretion may be optimal. In the context of our
stylized model, we find that civil law courts do not respond to shocks to the environment.
Conversely, the common law regime does innovate, but it proceeds by “slow advances”.13
Because of the inertia introduced by the rule of precedent, common law courts are cautious
in changing the precedent when facing a shock because they are afraid that in the next period
— when a new shock occurs — this new precedent may not be justified. With respect to the
“size” of the adjustment, what matters is the persistence of the shock (common law courts
change the law by a smaller amount after a temporary shock) as well as the proportion of
12For a discussion, see Merryman (2007) and Garoupa and Morriss (2012). See also again Footnote 2 above
on the use of the term consistency.
13Referring to the role of the judge, Cardozo famously wrote: “Justice is not to be taken by storm. She is
to be wooed by slow advances,” Cardozo (1924, p. 133).
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judges that strictly apply the rule of precedent (if this proportion is high, the expected inertia
of common law is stronger and current adjustments are smaller as a result). We find that
when shocks are persistent, welfare under common law is strictly higher, because of its greater
adaptability, than welfare under civil law for a broader range of parameters.
It is generally believed that precedents are more adaptable than statutes to changing
economic conditions. Such adaptability might account for the findings of La Porta et al.
(1998) of the superior development of financial markets in common-law compared to the
civil-law countries. This paper shows that common law courts respond to shocks more than
civil law courts, but less than optimally, especially when shocks are temporary.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. The
model is introduced in Section 3. Section 4 and 5 solve the model under common law and
under civil law. In Section 6 we compare the two regimes while in Section 7 we analyze how
the two legal traditions adapt to changing economic conditions. Section 8 concludes. For
ease of exposition, all proofs have been relegated in the Appendix.
2. Literature Review
The hypothesis that common law is efficient (and, possibly, superior to civil law) has been
widely investigated by the literature on law and economics. According to Posner (2003),
possibly the most influential scholar to endorse this view, judge-made laws are more efficient
than statutes, mainly because courts, unlike legislators, have personal incentives to maximize
efficiency.14 Evolutionary models of common law have called attention to explanations other
than judical preferences. For instance, it has been argued that case law moves towards
efficiency because inefficient rules are more often (Priest, 1977, and Rubin, 1977) or more
intensively (Goodman, 1978) challenged in courts than efficient ones. Gennaioli and Shleifer
(2007b) build a model of precedent formation by appellate courts and show that common law
evolves towards better legal rules only under special conditions. In their model, the evolution
of precedents is driven by judicial partisan bias, and new information is added as precedents
evolve. The intuition for this result is that polarized judges have stronger incentives to
distinguish the existing precedent in order to correct the bias of the previous court.15 As
14In Hadfield (1992), however, efficiency-oriented courts may fail to make efficient rules because of the bias
in the sample of cases observed by courts.
15Judicial bias is interpreted in a broad sense that ranges from “idiosyncracies” in the judges’ preferences
(Bond, 2009, Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2007b) to plain “corruption” of the courts (Ayres, 1997, Bond, 2008,
Legros and Newman, 2002, among others).
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in Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007b), all common law courts in our model should be viewed as
appellate courts since they have the ability to change the state of precedents.16 In a fully
dynamic model where courts have to spend time and resources investigating a case, Baker
and Mezzetti (2012) find that precedents might converge to an inefficient set of legal rules.17
Fon and Parisi (2006) study the dynamics of precedents under civil law. In their model, civil
law courts take past decisions into account when there is a sufficient level of consistency in
past judicial decisions (“jurisprudence constante”).18
Other papers have explicitly compared judge-made laws and statutes. In a pioneering
paper, Glaeser and Shleifer (2002) analyze common law (independent juries) and civil law
(bright line rules) in a static model with particular emphasis on the ability of each system
to control law enforcers. Ponzetto and Fernandez (2008) study a setting where judges have
idiosyncratic preferences and overruling is costly. They show that case law converges to an
asymptotic distribution with mean equal to the efficient rule. In the long run, as precedents
become more consistent, case law eventually dominates statute law by making better and
more predictable decisions. Recently, Guerriero (2016a, 2016b) has also compared common
law and civil law and shown that common law is preferable when preferences are heterogeneous
and/or political institutions are inefficient.
The disciplinary role of stare decisis has been pointed out by Anderlini et al. (2014).
However, this paper differs from Anderlini et al. (2014) in a number of important aspects,
some of which we already mentioned above. First, this paper proposes a model of the civil
law regime, while Anderlini et al. (2014) focuses exclusively on the common law regime.
Second, this paper simplifies the rule of precedent with respect to Anderlini et al. (2014). In
particular, in the latter paper the common-law equilibrium is generally in mixed strategies.
By simplifying the precedent technology we are able to consider a continuum of judicial
policies, while in Anderlini et al. (2014) the law only takes two values. Third, in Anderlini et
al. (2014) court payoffs are exogenously given, while in this paper they are micro-founded by
having a simple model of investment decisions. Fourth, compared to Anderlini et al. (2014),
16The efficiency rationale for an appeal system has been extensively studied (e.g., Daughety and Reinganum,
1999, 2000, Levy, 2005, Shavell, 1995, Spitzer and Talley, 2000), but its differential impact in civil and common
law is far from obvious, both theoretically and empirically.
17See also Callander and Clark (2017) who study common law dynamics in a model with judicial learning.
Gennaioli and Ponzetto (2017), instead, study the two-way feedback loop between legal rules and the economy.
18For an analysis of the implications of either persuasive or binding precedents on the courts’ incentives to
acquire information see Chen and Eraslan (2016).
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our focus is not only on legal efficiency, but also on legal consistency. Finally, in this paper
we introduce economic shocks and study the adaptability of each legal system.19
The related literature on rules versus standards (Posner, 1990, Kaplow, 1992, and Sun-
stein, 1995) has focused on other merits of rules. For instance, the benefit of predictability,
which is likely to result in more adherence to norms, more productive behavior, fewer dis-
putes, and more settlements. Rules reduce arbitrariness and bias: they bind a decision maker
to respond in a determinate way to some specific triggering facts. Finally, rules reduce the
cost of enforcement: they minimize the need of time-consuming balancing of all relevant
interests and facts.20
Finally, this paper is also related to a recent political economy literature which endogenises
property rights and studies the relation between the political structure and the extent of
property right protection. Acemoglu (2009, chapter 22), Besley and Ghatak (2010) and
Besley (2018) among many others analyze property right enforcement in the presence of a
commitment (or hold-up) problem that is similar to the one studied here.21 In all of these
contributions, the lack of property rights (or of their enforcement) can be thought of as
leading to an expropriation of the proceeds of one party’s investment by a third one, with the
consequent suboptimal incentives to invest.
In another vein Guerriero (2016c, 2018) focuses on other considerations shaping the choice
of the optimal level of property right protection.22 In the presence of transaction costs
that impede trade, he shows that strong property right protection is generally inefficient
because it implies misallocation, that is some high-valuation buyers are excluded from trade.
Interestingly, Guerriero (2016c) finds that the strength of property rights should increase
with preference heterogeneity.
19See also Anderlini et al. (2013) for an analysis of the implications of full discretion and commitment to
an incomplete law in an endogenous growth model with vertical innovation. That paper, however, focuses on
a rather different question: the rate of growth under different legal regimes. It also does not analyze the rule
of precedent, there is no judicial heterogeneity and civil law judges do not have any latitude in interpreting
the code.
20Shavell (2007) studies the optimal scope of discretion of a rule, which should balance the informational
advantage of adjudicators and the cost of delegation due to the adjudicators’ bias. Kaplow (1992) argues
that when the frequency with which similar cases arise is high, it is better to incur the one-time, up-front
investment to create a rule.
21See also Cervellati et al. (2007) and Diermeier et al. (2017). Of course pointing out the centrality of the
hold-up problem goes back to Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990).
22See also Bar-Gill and Persico (2016) and Segal and Whinston (2016).
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3. The Model
We build a stylized model to capture the courts’ trade-off between providing incentives and
ex-post efficiency. Consider an economy with a continuum of locations distributed on the
interval [0, 1]. Time is indexed by t with t = 1, ...,∞. Complete information of preferences
and of the structure of the game form is assumed throughout. The model includes two types
of players: private agents and courts.
3.1. Private Agents
In each location i ∈ [0, 1] there are two private agents, A and B, who live for one period.
Agents are assumed to be homogeneous across locations. At the end of each period, A and B
are replaced by two agents with the same characteristics. The population size of both types
of agents is normalized to one. Agent A in location i makes a costly and non-contractible
investment ei,t ∈ [0, 1] that increases output.
Agent B does not take any action. We denote by pt ∈ [0, 1] the law that is enforced in the
economy at time t. We will discuss law-making in Sections 4 and 5 below. For tractability
we assume the following utilities for all i ∈ [0, 1]:




uBi (ei,t, pt) = (1− pt)ei,t. (2)
The first term of (1) is the benefit of A’s investment choice ei,t to A himself. The second
term is A’s cost of investment. We interpret the first term as a “gross return” from investment
ei,t, multiplied by the share pt of such return that A is able to appropriate, to which we will
return shortly.
From (2), we define B’s payoff as the gross return from A’s investment, multiplied by the
share 1 − pt of such gross return that B is able to expropriate from A.23
23For further concreteness we could think of A as owning a plot of land and deciding how much to invest,
which in turn generates some gross output and has a cost, as in (1). Then B, whose land surrounds A’s plot,
can literally expropriate (or not as property rights protection allows) the gross output as it crosses his land
to reach the market. Examples of expropriation (or “tunneling”) allowed by courts are discussed in Johnson
et al. (2000).
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With this interpretation of the payoffs in (1) and (2) the parameter pt represents the
level of property rights protection that is enforced in the economy.24 In particular, pt = 1
stands for “absolute” property rights so that A appropriates the entire gross return from his
investment. At the opposite extreme, when pt = 0, B is able to expropriate the entire gross
return from A’s investment — property right protection is as weak as can be in this case.25
From (1) we compute the optimal investment decision of party A for a given law:
ei,t = pt. (3)
The higher pt, the higher A’s investment. Weak property rights decrease investment because
they represent a tax on A agents, that see the return on their investment partially seized
by B.26 The key channel through which the law affects economic outcomes in our model is
captured by equation (3).
3.2. Courts
The law for the entire economy is enforced by an infinitely-lived court.27 In each period,
the identity of the court enforcing the law is randomly drawn from the pool of courts and is
observed by A agents before they undertake investments. There are two types of courts. A
fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of courts are conservative (denoted by c) and make decisions in a mechanical
way. Under common law, conservative judges strictly follow the precedent, which coincides
with the enforced law from the previous period. Under civil law, conservative judges strictly
follow the statute. There are different reasons why judges are conservative: either because
24The thrust of our results remains unchanged under a variety of specifications for (1) and (2). For a
different specification, see a working paper version of this article (Anderlini et al., 2016), where B’s payoff is
separable in the two terms that represent the external effect that A’s investment produces and the parameter
pt governing the level of property rights protection.
25See Levine (2005) for a review of the literature on law and property rights. There is a large body of
work that analyzes conditions under which the allocation of property rights restores efficiency in models
where private agents lack commitment (see, for instance, Maskin and Tirole, 1999). This literature, however,
assumes that active courts can fully commit to future actions.
26As discussed in Besley (1995), there are other possible explanations for the positive relation between
property right protection and investment. For instance, better rights make it easier to use their property as
collateral, which diminishes the constraints on funding investments. Alternatively, investment is encouraged
if improved transfer rights make it easier for individuals to rent or sell their land.
27Whether or not parties actually go to court is not essential for our arguments. The level of property
right protection that is observed in the economy is the one that judges would choose if parties had gone to
court. If this were not the case, given that the two parties have opposite preferences about p, and provided
that going to court is not costly, one of the two parties would bring the other to court.
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they adhere to legal formalism (that is, they believe that the law consists of a body of rules
and judges have no authority to act outside these rules), because there might be some cost
(e.g, career concerns) of deviating from the code or precedent, or because judges follow simple
behavioural rules.28
A fraction (1 − γ) of judges are active (denoted by a) and select the law to balance
competing societal interests under the constraints that are specific to each legal regime. We
will discuss in more detail the two legal regimes in Sections 4 and 5 below. Let et denote the
vector of investments by all agents, we assume that the per-period utility of active courts is





In other words, active courts aggregate the payoffs of all agents in the economy. The welfare
weight on agents B is denoted by z. Throughout the paper, we will assume z > 1: agents B
have more weight than agents A.29 Clearly this is but one possibility in terms of the objective
function of active courts. It is the interesting case as far as our analysis is concerned. As is
intuitive, and as will be clear below as we proceed with the analysis, if we had z ≤ 1 so that
agents B do not have more weight than agents A, then the optimal level of property rights
protection is pt = 1. Whenever this is the case, the time-inconsistency problem of courts also
disappears. The infinitely-lived court in the economy discounts the future at a positive rate.
We denote by δ ∈ [0, 1) its discount factor. Finally, notice that we assume that all active
judges have the same preferences and thus abstract from judicial partisanship.30
The timing of events during a period is as follows. At the beginning of period t the value
of pt−1 — the state of precedents in common law, and the statute in civil law — is given.
The type of court (active or not) that enforces the law at time t is randomly drawn and is
publicly revealed. Afterwards, A agents undertake investments. Finally, the court enforces
28“[When judges] are trained to think in mechanical and doctrinal rather than functional and substantive
terms, mental habits are developed that stand in the way of the perception requisite to a truly functional
approach.” Von Mehren, (1957, p. 825).
29In a world with transferable utilities this has the same effect as saying that individuals B value more
the good than the legal owners (individuals A). As shown by the “misallocation literature” (see the last
paragraph of Section 2 above), this might justify weak property right protection.
30It is quite difficult to assess the extent of judicial partisanship in the data because the cases that go
to court constitute a selected sample. Ashenfelter et al (1995) control for this selection bias and find little
evidence of judicial partisanship, at least in US Federal Courts. Surprisingly, they find that the character-
istics of the judge and the political party of the judge’s appointing president are not significant predictor of
judicial decisions. Judicial bias, however, might be more severe in countries with weaker institutions (e.g.,
see Lambert-Mogiliansky et al, 2007).
Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 11
the law for the entire economy. Notice that, given that the identity of the court is observed
before the investment decision, agents correctly foresee the level of property right protection
that will be enforced. At time t + 1 the timing of events is repeated as for t,31 with a new
i.i.d. draw selecting the court’s type.
We are concerned with the subgame perfect equilibria of the dynamic game(s) generated
by our set up.32 As it is well known in dynamic games the set of subgame perfect equilibria
is generally very large. To cut down the set of equilibria, we will focus on symmetric Markov
perfect equilibria.33 It should be noted that in the remainder of this Section and in Section
4 below there is no “payoff relevant” Markov state, and so our attention will be restricted
to stationary symmetric equilibria. In Section 5 the payoff relevant Markov state becomes
the state of precedents pt−1, although it is directly relevant at t only to a class of players
that in effect do not take any decisions in the period. Finally in Section 7 the full-blown
definition of Markov perfect equilibrium has force. In this Section we consider stochastic
(Markov) changes in the environment (in the weight z) and examine the adaptability and
other properties of common and civil law in this new environment.
As a benchmark, we identify the optimal law under commitment at time t. More specifi-
cally, we assume that the law is chosen by a social planner before A agents undertake invest-
ments. Under commitment, the planner correctly internalizes that the law affects investment
through (3). Assume that the social planner’s welfare function is given by (4). Since we
focus on symmetric equilibria, we can easily aggregate agents’ payoffs and write the planner’s
problem in each period:




p2t + (1− pt)ptz. (5)
We state without proof the following result.
Proposition 1. (Optimal Law) When courts can commit to a law before the investment





31The law of motion governing the evolution of pt will be different between the common law and the civil
law case.
32Under “commitment” in both common law and civil law in the sense specified below.
33See Maskin and Tirole (2001).
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Since z > 1 it must be that p∗t < 1: it is never optimal to commit to “absolute” en-
forcement of property rights. Moreover, p∗t is decreasing in z. Intuitively, when agents B are
weighed relatively more, the optimal level of property-right protection becomes weaker. In
our stylized model the optimal law is uniquely pinned down by the tradeoff between providing
incentives and ex-post efficiency.
In the next three sections, we analyze law-making without commitment and investigate
whether the enforced law in the two legal regimes is close to the optimal one. Since we focus
on stationary symmetric equilibria we are able to suppress the explicit time index t without
causing any ambiguity.
4. Civil Law
Under civil law the role of judges is to interpret and apply a body of statutes and administra-
tive regulations. We denote the statute by l ∈ [0, 1]. We assume that the statute is written
once and for all at the beginning of time 1.34 We initially take l as given and we discuss the
choice of the statute at the end of this section. In this paper we assume that civil law courts
must choose p in the interval [l − ε, l + ε]. The parameter ε ∈ (0, 1/2] is a measure of the
courts’ latitude in interpreting the statute. The parameter ε might be related to the specific
issue discussed in the law (for example, ambiguous matters may give judges more discretion)
or to the capacity of the legislative and executive branches to control the judicial branch.
Notice that under civil law past decisions do not affect current decisions and, consequently,
are not payoff relevant. Since we focus on Stationary Markov Equilibria, this implies that
there is no dynamic link across periods, so that the problem of civil law courts is de facto
static.35
Conservative courts are not strategic players since they simply apply the statute. There-
fore, for civil law courts of type a a strategy is a mapping from aggregate effort to the
34On this point, Cooley (1868) writes: “[I]t is said that which distinguishes a judicial from a legislative act
is that the one is a determination of what the existing law is in relation to some existing thing already done
or happened, while the other is a predetermination of what the law shall be for the regulation of all future
cases.”
35This would not be the case if we allowed judges to use history-dependent strategies, but this is precluded
by our restricting attention to Markov perfect equilibria. Since precedents are not a primary source of law
under civil law, we believe the assumption that courts’ strategies do not condition on past decisions to be
compelling.
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law: pa : [0, 1] → [l − ε, l + ε]. For agent A in location i, a stationary strategy under the
enforcement of court j ∈ {a, c} is an investment decision eji ∈ [0, 1].







specifies equilibrium laws and aggregate investments under the enforcement of court j ∈
{a, c}. In equilibrium, the following conditions must hold.
(i) The law chosen by conservative courts coincides with the statute: pcS = l.
(ii) Given aggregate effort eaS , the law chosen by active courts solves the court’s ex-post
problem:






2 + (1− p)eaSz. (7)
(iii) Given expected enforcement pjS , agents A optimally choose investment:







Comparing problems (5) and (7), notice that after investment has been undertaken, active
courts do not internalize that strong property right protection encourages investment. Since
judicial decisions are expected to be “weak”, equilibrium investment will be low. In essence,
this is a manifestation of the so-called hold-up problem.
We determine the ex-post rule when judges must choose the law in the interval [l − ε, l + ε].
It can be easily observed from (7) that the ex-post utility is decreasing in p. As a result,
courts choose the weakest ruling among the feasible ones and the constraint p ≥ l − ε is
binding. The ex-post rule is horizontal at p = l − ε.
The equilibrium outcome, as depicted in Figure 1 below, is then given by the intersection
of the ex-post rule with the aggregate investment rule, which coincides with the 45 degree line.
As we narrow judicial latitude ε, equilibrium law and investment get closer to l. When instead
judges have broader latitude, the ex-post rule shifts down, making the hold-up problem more
severe.











Proposition 2. (Civil Law) Let any statute l ∈ [0, 1] be given. When an active judge
enforces the law, the equilibrium outcome (paS , e
a
S) is equal to (l−ε, l−ε) when l > ε and (0,0)
when l ≤ ε. When a conservative judge enforces the law, the equilibrium outcome (pcS , ecS) is
given by (l, l).
So far we have taken the statute as exogenous. Our next step is to analyze the benchmark
case of a statute that is chosen under the veil of ignorance by a legislature that maximizes
the same welfare function as active courts (4).36 This constitutes a useful benchmark. At the
same time, we recognize that in practice statutes might be written in a biased manner. This
occurs, for instance, when one of the two groups of agents is politically powerful.37
The statute is written at the beginning of t = 1 knowing that with probability γ the
court will follow l, but with probability 1− γ the court will optimize. We let W (e, p) denote
welfare under civil law when aggregate effort is e and the law is p. We show (see the proof of
Proposition 3 in the Appendix) that given our parameter restrictions, the planner does not
find it profitable to set the code below ε. Therefore, using Proposition 2, the optimal statute
solves the following static problem:
max
l∈[0,1]
γ W (l, l) + (1− γ) W (l − ε, l − ε). (9)
36In a similar vein Cardozo writes: “Substitute statute for [judicial] decision, and you shift the center of
authority, but add no quota of inspired wisdom,” Cardozo (1924, p. 133).
37See Guerriero (2016a).
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It is now immediate to find the optimal statute for extreme values of γ. When γ is either
zero or one, civil law reaches full efficiency. If γ = 1 (all courts are conservative), the optimal
statute prescribes l = p∗,38 which is enforced by all judges. If γ = 0 (all courts are active),
the civil law implements the optimal law by overshooting and setting l = p∗+ ε. If γ ∈ (0, 1),
welfare under civil law is below the first-best level.
Proposition 3. (Optimal Statute) Under civil law, the code is optimally set above the
optimal law p∗:
l = p∗ + (1− γ)ε. (10)
The law is optimally set between p∗ and p∗+ε and the solution of problem (9) has the simple
expression (10). Notice that the enforced law alternates between l (with probability γ) and
l − ε (with probability 1 − γ). Judicial heterogeneity leads to legal inconsistency: similar
cases are treated differently.
It is interesting to notice that, at least in expectation, the enforced law is efficient. In
fact, the expected law is given by E(p) = γl+ (1− γ)(l− ε) = p∗. However, when ε > 0 and
γ ∈ (0, 1), the optimal law is never implemented. Conservative (respectively active) judges
enforce property right protection above (respectively below) the optimal level. We stress
that the “overshooting result” of Proposition 3 holds even when the statute writer does not
maximize social welfare. In this case, the statute would be set above the one preferred by
the biased statute writer (see the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix).
We provide some support to our claim that statutes are written in anticipation of the
application of the law by looking at the conception of property rights in France. Article 544
of the French Napoleonic Code famously states that ownership is the right to use and dispose
of property in the most absolute way. In the French revolutionary reform program, having
individual sovereignty over property was regarded as the most effective barrier against the
power of the state. The idea that property rights should be absolute was soon challenged
because of its antisocial implications. Even if the French Code kept proclaiming an absolute
proprietary freedom, French courts escaped from a literal interpretation of the Code. Com-
paring nuisance laws in France and England, Weir writes: “French law initially gives a broad
right by statute and then restricts its antisocial use by the courts; in England, when it is the
38Recall that p∗ is the optimal level of enforcement under commitment as computed in Proposition 1.
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courts who announce the rights, they do it so very restrictively that there is little need for an
equitable temperance of their exercise.”39 This suggests that the law often sets stricter rules
than the ex ante optimum, so that the ex-post courts’ decisions are closer to the optimum.
5. Common Law
Common law is established by judicial precedents and decisions. We assume that active
judges can potentially make any decision p in the entire interval [0, 1]. In other words, past
decisions do not restrict the set of feasible judgements of active courts.40 Notice that, for
simplicity, we make the following two assumptions on the evolution of precedents. We assume
that conservative courts have no effect on precedents — this seems uncontroversial since they
only enforce the law as they inherit it from the past. By contrast, active courts change the
state of precedents in a “complete” way. If an active court chooses a particular level of p, say
p̃, then the precedent immediately changes to p̃ from that point on, and only another active
court decision (different from p̃) can change it again.
As before, restricting attention to symmetric equilibria tells us that we only need to con-
sider paths in which all A agents undertake the same investment.41 We let p−1 denote the cur-
rent precedent. Suppose first that a conservative court is drawn to enforce the law. Because
conservative courts uphold the precedent, p−1 is a payoff-relevant state for the investment
decision. For agent A in location i, a strategy under court c is a mapping eci : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
where eci(p−1) is the investment decision by i given the current precedent.
Suppose instead that an active court is drawn to enforce the law. Since we restrict
attention to Markov equilibria, for agent A in location i a strategy is an investment decision
eai ∈ [0, 1]. Recall that active courts are not restricted at all by p−1 in the set of feasible
decisions. Hence for common law courts of type a a strategy is a mapping pa : [0, 1]→ [0, 1],
where pa(e) is the law chosen by active courts given aggregate effort e. We denote by ec(p−1)
and ea the aggregate investment rule under conservative and active courts, respectively.
Since conservative judges uphold the current precedent, active courts recognize that their
decisions will affect future decisions through a change of precedents. Let any aggregate
39Weir in Catala and Weir (1964) p. 238.
40To the best of our knowledge no common law judge has even been impeached for not following precedent
not even when precedent was set by a superior court.
41This does not mean that we restrict agents to choose the same action. Indeed, A agents can choose any
investment in the interval [0,1]. In a symmetric equilibrium, however, it is optimal for identical agents to
choose the same action.
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investment e be given, the dynamic problem of an active court can be formulated recursively:
V a(e) = max
p∈[0,1]
{W (p, e) + δ(1− γ)V a(ea) + δγV c(p, ec(p))} , (11)
where V a and V c are the value function of an active judge when, respectively, an active court
and a conservative court are recognized to enforce the law. Since a conservative judge always
keeps the precedent, one obtains
V c(p, ec(p)) = W (p, ec(p)) + δ(1− γ)V a(ea) + δγV c(p, ec(p)). (12)
In the equilibrium under common law, the following conditions must hold.
(i) For all p−1 and e the law chosen by conservative courts coincides with the precedent:
pc(p−1, e) = p−1.
(ii) For all e, the policy rule of active courts pa(e) solves the right-hand side of (11).
(iii) Given expected enforcement, A’s investment is optimal:












The first order conditions for an active court are then given by:42
e(z − 1) = δγ
(1− δγ)
(p+ z − 2pz) (14)
The court’s trade-off is intuitive. The left side of (14) is the court’s present bias: after
the investment by A is sunk, the active court wants to weaken property right protection if
it looks only at today’s payoff. On the other hand, if it looks forward, via precedents, the
court wants to make the optimal decision to encourage investment. The right side of (14) is
the marginal cost of “worsening” the precedents. The higher the proportion of conservative
judges, the higher the cost of choosing weak property right protection. This is because a
higher γ prolongs the cost of a deviation from the ex-ante optimal decision.
42See the proof of Proposition 4 in the Appendix.
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− e(z − 1)(1− γδ)
(2z − 1)γδ
. (15)
The court’s ex-post rule (15) is decreasing in e and does not depend on p−1. As before, the
equilibrium law chosen by an active court is at the intersection between the investment rule
(3) and the court’s reaction function (15) (see Figure 2 below). We let pC denote the law
chosen by an active court. As soon as an active court is recognized to enforce the law, the
precedent settles to pC.
Proposition 4. (Common Law) Under common law, starting from any p−1 ∈ [0, 1] as
soon as an active court makes a decision, the precedent settles to
pC =
δγz
(1− δγ)(z − 1) + γδ(2z − 1)
. (16)
Notice that pC < p
∗
t . As δγ → 1 the law under common law converges to the optimal one.











High values of γ are associated with higher investment levels and higher expected welfare.
A potential objection is based on the observation that if most judges are conservative, it takes
more time to reverse a “bad” initial precedent at t = 1. A straightforward way to address
this concern is to assume that in the first period all judges are active because there is no
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previous ruling on which to base the current decision. The observation that high values of
γ might lengthen the transition to the efficient rule will be relevant when we assume that
there are shocks to the optimal law. In Section 7 below we will indeed show that common
law welfare is not always increasing in γ.
Before concluding, we stress that in our model the state variable only includes the previous
judicial decision.43 If instead we assumed that all past decisions matter, the solution would be
considerably more involved. Since the effect of each judicial decision would be less dramatic,
we expect that the disciplinary role of stare decisis will be diminished. Courts will have the
temptation to free-ride on others’ responsibility, leading to weaker property right protection.
On the other hand, if there are economic shocks, as in Section 7, we expect judges to be more
flexible and adapt to changing economic conditions.44
6. Common Law vs Civil Law: Efficiency and Consistency
In this section, we compare common law and civil law along two dimensions of interest: the
consistency of legal decisions and overall efficiency.
Concerning the variability of legal decisions, notice that as soon as the law is enforced
by an active court, common law will reach an “absorbing state” and both types of courts
select the same law. Under civil law, however, the law is not applied uniformly and there is
variability of legal decisions. We stress that this result is obtained in a model where judges
face an ex-post bias and differ only with respect to their legal reasoning (some judges are
conservative, while others maximize welfare). If we introduced judicial partisan bias, the
variance of common law decisions would also be positive.45 An empirical test of whether
common law is more consistent than civil law is well beyond the scope of this paper. The
empirical evidence on this question is quite limited though. On the one hand, Djankov et al.
(2003) find that common law courts are more consistent than civil law courts, in line with
43This implies that a single decision (even a “wrong” one) will affect judicial decisions. We believe that
this assumption captures an important feature of stare decisis. As recognized by Justice Scalia (Hubbard v.
United States (94-172), 514 U.S. 695, 1995), “the doctrine [of stare decisis] would be no doctrine at all” if
it did not require overruling judges to “give reasons, that go beyond mere demonstration that the overruled
opinion was wrong.” Along similar lines, Padden, (1994) writes: “If wrongness were a sufficient basis for
overruling precedent, each Justice could decide each case as if it were one of first impression and entirely
disregard any precedent.”
44We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this point.
45See Section 8 of Anderlini et al. (2016) for the derivation of this result.
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the results of this paper.46 On the other hand, Niblett et al. (2010) show that common law
decisions do not converge over time to any resting point.
To consider the relative efficiency of the two regimes, we compute the expected welfare
in both legal systems. In Figures 3 and 4 below we draw the welfare under common law
assuming, as we discussed in the previous section, that at t = 1 — when there is no previous
precedent on which to base the current decision — all judges are active.
Welfare under civil law reaches full efficiency when γ = 0 and γ = 1 and is at its minimum
when judicial heterogeneity is maximal, γ = 1/2. Judicial independence (measured by ε) is
welfare reducing since it increases credibility problems when an active judge decides and
induces the legislature to increase l compared to the optimal p∗,47 which is costly when
a conservative judge decides. Notice that welfare under common law is increasing in γ.
However, to the extent that the discount factor is less than 1, common law is bounded away
from full efficiency (see also Anderlini et al. 2014). Common law can be quite far from the
optimum, but at least it is consistent and treats similar people similarly. This shows that
there might exist a trade-off between legal consistency and efficiency.
Figure 3 Figure 4
Welfare: High ε Welfare: Low ε
















































ε = 0.45, δ = 0.95, z = 2 ε = 0.2, δ = 0.95, z = 2
We can show that if judicial latitude is sufficiently broad, welfare under common law is
strictly above welfare under civil law when γ is not too large, but not too small either (see
46Notice, however, that the assumption that legal traditions can be measured through legal origins dummies
has been challenged, among others, by Rosenthal and Voeten (2007).
47As defined in Proposition 1.
Anderlini, Felli and Riboni 21
Figure 3). When instead ε is sufficiently low, civil law strictly dominates (see Figure 4).
Proposition 5. (Welfare Comparison) When ε is sufficiently small, civil law strictly
dominates common law. When instead ε is sufficiently large and δ is sufficiently close to 1,
there is an interior range of values of γ for which common law dominates civil law.
7. Legal Adaptability
In the previous section, the only source of uncertainty in the economy concerned the type of
court making decisions. In this section, we introduce an additional source of uncertainty by
assuming that there are shocks that change the optimal law p∗ of Proposition 1. It is often
argued that common law deals better with an uncertain environment and allows for a perfect
mix between change and continuity. This section tests this claim.
We focus on shocks to the parameter z. In each t, the parameter z can either be zH or zL
with zH > zL. We assume that the shock at time t is observed by all players at the beginning
of the period. Shocks are distributed according to a discrete Markov chain with transition
probability: πji = Prob{zi | zj} and
2∑
i=1
πji = 1, with j, i ∈ {H,L}. Knowing the transition










To simplify the algebra, we henceforth make the assumption that the transition-probability
matrix is symmetric. The elements along the main diagonal of the transition matrix measure
the probabilities that a state does not change. If economic shocks exhibit no persistance, the
probabilities of remaining in a particular state or transiting to the other state would all be
equal to 1/2. Shock persistence is hence measured by ρ ≡ πLL = πHH ∈ [1/2, 1].
Following the incomplete contracts literature, we assume that the code or the precedent
cannot be contingent on these shocks. We justify this assumption by postulating that these
shocks are difficult to describe in advance, even if their consequences and probabilities are
known by all players.49
48See, for instance, Howard (1960, ch. 1).
49The notion of “undescribable events” has been advanced by Anderlini and Felli (1994) and Al-Najjar et
al. (2007). Notice that we are not claiming that in the real world all shocks are undescribable. We focus on
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7.1. Adaptability under Civil Law
Under civil law the statute is written under a double veil of ignorance: without knowing which
judge will enforce the law in each period and without knowing which shock will occur in each
period. Since the code is written before the t = 1 shock is realized, the stationary probabilities
πH and πL are used to compute the expected payoffs. Notice that shocks to z do not change
the court’s reaction function in Figure 1. Hence, they do not change the intersection with
the investment rule. We therefore obtain that civil law judges are totally unresponsive to
shocks. To understand the intuition of why shocks do not affect courts’ decisions, recall that
the constraint p ≥ l−ε is binding for active judges, who choose the weakest ruling among the
feasible ones. Shocks to the economic environment make this constraint more or less binding,







+ (1− γ)ε. (18)
Similarly to Proposition 3, the statute is set above the expected optimal law. Conservative
judges choose p = l, while active judges select p = l − ε. Notice that the code internalizes
the occurrence of the shocks to z, but civil law does not adapt. The variability of the law
does not arise because judges respond to changing economic conditions, but, as in Section
4, it arises because of judicial heterogeneity. Therefore, similarly to what we found in an
economy without shocks, under civil law welfare is at its maximum when there is no judicial
heterogeneity (that is, judges are either all conservative or all active).50
7.2. Adaptability under Common Law
Common law is potentially more adaptable to shocks than civil law as active courts can choose
any law in the interval [0, 1]. However, common law courts must be cautious in changing the
law. Since the precedent cannot be made contingent on economic conditions, changing the
undescribable shocks because, if courts were facing describable shocks, the analysis here would be identical
to the one in the previous sections, after we define the decision space as [0, 1] × {zH , zL}. Similarly, we do
not consider shocks that were not foreseen at t = 0. Under such shocks the welfare comparison between the
two regimes would not be very interesting, as the common law, by making decision sequentially, would likely
dominate.
50In this paper, we assume that the statute is written once-and-for-all. At first sight, this assumption seems
to hinder welfare under civil law, especially when shocks are persistent. Notice, however, that if writing new
statutes were costless and if statutes were retroactive, in all periods the statute would be changed ex-post,
so that equilibrium investment would be zero as in a model with full discretion.
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precedent is costly. Indeed, if tomorrow’s shock is different and a conservative court enforces
the law, the previous precedent will be confirmed, even if it was intended for a different value
of z. As we show below, the lower the shock’s persistence, the weaker and more cautious the
response of common law courts.
In an economic environment without shocks, we showed that having more conservative
judges is welfare increasing under common law (Proposition 4). With shocks, the optimal
amount of “conservativeness” is not necessarily the maximum one. On the one hand, as in
the model without shocks, a larger share of conservative judges provides commitment and
pushes the laws towards their optimal values (disciplinary effect). On the other hand, when
economic conditions change, a higher γ increases the probability that a “bad” precedent stays
in place, making courts more cautious in changing the law (incongruity effect).
Shocks to z change the dynamic trade-off faced by active courts. Recalling that the ex-post
bias is given by e(z−1), a higher z raises the current temptation of weakening property-right
protection. On the other hand, when the shock is persistent, a higher z lowers the law that
is expected to be optimal in the future.
In Figure 5 below we compute the laws chosen by active courts in the two states as a
function of the proportion of conservative judges.51 We consider two different levels of shock
persistence (ρ = 0.5 and ρ = 0.95) and the following two levels of z: zL = 1.1 and zH = 3.
From Proposition 1, we know that the optimal law is equal to 0.92 in the low state and is
equal to 0.6 in the high state. In Figure 5, the optimal laws are represented by two horizontal
lines. We denote by pTL and p
T
H the laws chosen by active judges in state L and H, respectively,
when shocks are fully transitory (that is ρ = 0.5), while we denote by pPL and p
P
H the laws
chosen by active judges in state L and H when the shocks are persistent (that is ρ = 0.95).
Figure 5 illustrates that when zL occurs, courts choose a law that is closer to the static
optimum (0.92) when shocks are persistent than when they are temporary. The reason is
given by the incongruity effect. When the shock has low persistance, judges are afraid of
choosing the law that is optimal in the current state (p = 0.92) because they realize that
the state is temporary and that in the future conservative judges will enforce the current law
even when economic conditions change. As a result, common law judges implement the law
that is optimal on average, not the one that is currently optimal.
51In the Appendix we provide the conditions that implicitly define the laws chosen by active courts in the
two states. Simple analytical solutions can be obtained for limiting cases, when shocks are fully transitory.
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Figure 5
Common Law
























δ = 0.95, zL = 1.1, zH = 3
Notice that judicial inertia has a non-monotone effect on judicial adaptability, measured by
the vertical distance between the laws chosen by active courts in the two states. Common law
courts adapt more to changing economic conditions when γ is intermediate. To understand
this, notice that when γ is close to one, there is “too much” inertia under common law.
As a result, courts are cautious and choose similar laws in both states. When γ is close to
zero common law courts make similar decisions for a different reason. When there are no
conservative judges, stare decisis cannot play a disciplinary role. Consequently, active judges
behave myopically and the equilibrium law coincides with the static law without commitment,
which is equal to zero in both states.
It is often argued that the rule of precedent makes common law adaptable to changing eco-
nomic conditions (see Beck et al., 2003a, 2005). This section shows that common law courts
indeed respond to shocks, but less than optimally, especially when shocks are temporary.
7.3. Common Law vs Civil Law: a Comparison
Figure 6 below compares ex-ante welfare in the two legal systems. When shocks are persistent
common law might dominate civil law even when civil law judges have no discretion (ε = 0)
because it is more adaptable. Figure 6 illustrates that when γ is equal to 1, common law
welfare might be strictly higher than civil law welfare.
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Figure 6
Common Law























δ = 0.95, zL = 1.1, zH = 3, ε = 0.4, ρ = 0.95
Notice that in an economy without shocks to z, this possibility never arises: Figures 3
and 4 show that when γ=1 civil law strictly dominates common law. Further, we find that
expected welfare under common law is not necessarily monotone in γ. As discussed before,
when there are many conservative judges, “bad” precedents might stay in place for long
periods. This effect might induce judges to respond less to shocks and counterbalances the
positive disciplinary effect of a higher γ. Our numerical computations show that when shocks
are persistent, common law welfare is maximized when γ is less than one. In Figure 6 the
value of γ which optimally trades-off commitment against flexibility is 0.8.
Proposition 6. (Welfare Comparison with Shocks) Assume that δγ is sufficiently
close to 1. When shocks are sufficiently persistent (ρ is sufficiently close to 1) welfare under
common law is greater than welfare under civil law for any level of judicial latitude ε.
8. Conclusions
This paper sets up a stylized model to analyze judicial decision making. The related literature
has mostly focused on judicial partisan bias. Instead, here we focus on another source of
judicial bias. We analyze a setting in which courts face commitment problems in enforcing
the law. We compare court decisions under common and the civil law regimes. Our model
generates different economic implications under the two legal systems which are not based
on differences in preferences between judges and legislatures.
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Overall, we show that common law is generally more consistent and predictable than civil
law. With respect to efficiency, our analysis indicates no clear answer to the question of which
is the most efficient legal system. Among other things, the answer depends on the degree
of persistence of shocks, on the composition of the judiciary, and on the extent of judicial
independence. This is probably the reason why legal systems continuously evolve over time
(Berkowitz et al. 2003, Guerriero, 2006b). The U.S. legal system is no exception. As pointed
out by Calabresi (1982), “The last fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental change in
American law. In this time we have gone from a legal system dominated by the common
law, divined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become the
primary source of law.” More recently, Ferejohn (2002) sees a shift in lawmaking power
away from legislatures and a rise of the centrality of courts. Since any adjustment to the
judicial-legislative balance is up to society, one should model in a more realistic way the
political decision process. As a further step toward realism, the assumption that judges and
legislatures maximize the same objective should be re-examined. We leave this extension for
future work.
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Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and R. Levine (2003a) “Law and Finance: Why Does
Legal Origin Matter?” Journal of Comparative Economics, 31(4): 653-675.
Beck, T., A. Demirgüç-Kunt and R. Levine (2003b) “Law, Endowments and Finance.”
Journal of Financial Economics. 70: 137-81.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2: Let any l ∈ [0, 1] be given. We show that when an active court
decides, the equilibrium without commitment is (0, 0) or (l − ε, l − ε).
We need to show that the ex-post rule intersects the investment rule at l − ε if l − ε ≥ 0
and at 0 if l < ε.
It can be easily checked that when z > 1 the ex-post payoff is decreasing in p. Therefore,
the court chooses the lowest feasible law. Then, given a code l ∈ [0, 1] and given e ≥ 0, we
can write the reaction function of the court: for all e ∈ [0, 1] we have pex = {l − ε, 0}. It is
easy to verify that in all possible cases the ex-post rule intersects the 45 degree line at either
0 (when 0 ≤ l < ε) or l − ε (when 0 < l − ε).
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: First, we show that the social planner does not find it optimal




In this case, choosing l < ε is clearly suboptimal. In fact, by writing a “higher” code, the
legislator could increase her utility when a conservative judge is drawn, without affecting the
legal decision of active courts. The above inequality holds for all z > 1 when ε ≤ 1/2, as
required.













+ (1− l + ε)(l − ε)z)
]
(20)
Taking the first-order conditions and using Proposition 1, the optimal code can be written as
l = p∗ + (1− γ)ε. (21)
Notice that provided that z > 1, this result holds regardless of the z of the legislator. We
denote by p∗z the optimal policy under commitment of the biased legislator. Following similar
steps, we obtain that the statute would be l = p∗z + (1− γ)ε.
Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4: From (12) we obtain
V c(p, ec(p)) =
1
1− δγ




We can therefore rewrite the Bellman equation as
V a(e) = max
p∈[0,1]
{
W (p, e) +
δγ
(1− δγ)
W (p, ec(p)) +
δ2γ(1− γ)
(1− δγ)




V a(e) = max
p∈[0,1]
{
W (p, e) +
δγ
(1− δγ)






Using (3) we know that ec(p) = p. The derivative of V a(e) with respect to the current precedent
p is zero. This is because the current precedent does not constrain the choice of an active court.
Thus, the first order condition of an active court is given by the expression (14) in the main text.
To find the law chosen by an active court, we solve a system between e = p and (15), which gives
us pC , as stated in Proposition 4.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: We write down welfare under common law. Assuming that at time




+ (1− pC)pCz (25)
where pC is given by Proposition 4.











+ (1− (l − ε))(l − ε)z
]
(26)
where, using Proposition 3, l = z2z−1 + (1− γ)ε.
We are now ready to prove Proposition 5. First, we prove that common law is dominated by
civil law when γ is either close to 1 or 0. Notice that when γ = 0, from Proposition 4, pC = 0, which
implies that investment is also zero. Welfare under common law is then zero. On the other hand,
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when γ = 0 civil law reaches full efficiency, by simply setting l = p? + ε. Similarly, when γ = 1
civil law reaches full efficiency, but not common law (provided that δ < 1). By continuity, when γ
is close to 0 and 1, civil law is a superior legal tradition.
We now show that there is a interior range of values of γ such that common law dominates civil





= (z − 1
2
)ε2 (27)






(pC + z + 2zpC) =
γz[(1− γδ)(z − 1)) + γδ(z − 1)]
((1− γδ)(z − 1)) + γδ(2z − 1))2
(pC + z + 2zpC) (28)







. As γδ approches 1, we have thatWC converges toWS from below. Second, note
that the derivative of WS at γ = 1 is strictly positive and increasing in ε. On the other hand, as δ
approches 1, the derivative of WC at γ = 1 approaches zero. This is a consequence of the Envelope
Theorem. Then, WS <WC for some γ < 1 .
Q.E.D.
Legal Adaptability: Bellman Equation and Value Functions
The current shock is a payoff-relevant state. Investment rules are now a function of the current
state as well. We denote by pi the law chosen by active courts in the i state. When shock zi occurs,
with i = 1, 2, the Bellman equation of an active court becomes:
V a(e, zi) = max
pi∈[0,1]
W (p, e, zi) + δ ∑
j=L,H
πij [(1− γ)V a(ea(zj), zj) + γV c(p, ec(p, zj), zj)]
 . (29)
We denote V c(p, ec(p, zi), zi) and W (p, e
c(p, zi), zi) by, respectively, V
c(zi) and W (zi). The equilib-
rium effort ea(zj) in state j is denoted by e
L. After some algebra, for any i = 1, 2 and j 6= i, we
obtain
V c(zi) =
[W (zi) + δπij(1− γ)V (zj) + δπii(1− γ)V (zi)] (1− δγπjj)
(1− γδπjj)(1− γδπii)− γ2δ2πijπji
+
δγπij [W (zj) + δπjj(1− γ)V (zj) + δπji(1− γ)V (zi)]
(1− γδπjj)(1− γδπii)− γ2δ2πijπji
.
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These expressions allow to write down the first-order conditions of active courts. The first-order




− δγπLH(1− γδπLL) + δ
2γ2πLLπLH
(1− γδπLL)(1− γδπHH)− δ2γ2πHLπLH
(pL + zH − 2pLzH)
(30)
− δ
2γ2πLHπHL + δγπLL(1− γδπHH)
(1− γδπLL)(1− γδπHH)− δ2γ2πLHπHH
(pL + zL − 2pLzL) = 0
The first-order condition when zH occurs is symmetric. When states are transitory (πji = 1/2







(pL + zH − 2pLzH) + πL
δγ
1− δγ
(pL + zL − 2pLzL). (31)







(pH + zH − 2pHzH) + πL
δγ
1− δγ
(pH + zL − 2pHzL). (32)
In equilibrium, ej = pj . We can therefore solve the systems of two equations and find the optimal
pH and pL.
Proof of Proposition 6:
We provide the welfare definitions under common and civil law. Recalling that the transition
probability matrix is symmetric, one obtains πH = πL = 1/2. Then, civil law welfare under the veil




[γW (l, l; zL) + (1− γ)W (l − ε, l − ε; zL) + γW (l, l; zH) + (1− γ)W (l − ε, l − ε; zH)] , (33)
where l is given by (18).
Under common law, we keep assuming that at t = 0, when there is no precedent, all judges are
active. Expected common law welfare is defined as follows:
W ′C = (1− δ)
1
2













(1− γ)V a(zj) + γV c(pH ; zj)
]
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Notice that under civil law decisions are not affected by ρ: in both states, active judges select
l − ε. Because civil law is not adaptable, civil law welfare is strictly below the first-best level.
Consider now common law judges. From the first-order conditions in the common law problem –
e.g., equation (30)–, notice that as γδ and ρ go to 1, the enforced laws converge to the optimal ones.
Then, in that range of parameters, common law strictly dominates civil law regardless of ε .
Q.E.D.
